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Financial conglomerates are groups of corporate entities engaged in financial services
activities, such as commercial and retail banking, securities underwriting and trading,
investment management, and insurance underwriting.  Financial conglomerates may form
part of mixed-activity  conglomerates that engage in substantial commercial or industrial
activities.
The principal purpose of this paper is to describe the supervisory issues that arise when
financial services are provided via a conglomerate structure, and to offer practical
altematives for regulation and supervision.  In addition, the recommendations set out in the
paper espouse a specific supervisory philosophy that is applicable to the supervision of
financial institutions generally.  The paper is intended principally as a Handbook  for
authorities in the World Bank Group's client countries responsible  for determining financial
sector regulation and conducting supervision of financial institutions.  It also will be of use
to World Bank Group staff  engaged  in financial sector operations, particularly as a guide for
the establishment of project objectives.
Part I of this paper provides relevant background. It views the emergence of financial
conglomerates as an inevitable market development to which most countries' regulators
and supervisors (collectively referred to as the "authorities" hereafter) will need to respond.
It identifes  three principal supervisory concerns that arise in the context of conglomerates
(contagion, transparency and autonomny)  and briefly describes the two basic approaches to
regulation of financial institutions used by bank, securities and insurance supervisors
(consolidated regulation and separate regulation).  Part I concludes with an overview of the
regulatory and supervisory responses  to  conglomerates  that are being developed in
multinational forums.
Part 11  sets out practical regulatory and supervisory alternatives for authorffles confronted
with financial conglomerates. Throughout Part 11,  key issues requiring policy decisions are
identified.  Preferred regulatory and supervisory solutions, as well as alternatives, are
described.  Part 11  makes extensive reference, by way of footnotes, to the regulatory
framework that has been adopted by the EEC.
The four principal too:s that the authorities must employ in dealing with financial
conglomerates are authorization criteria, prudential regulation, accounting consolidation,
and consolidated supervision.  Authorization  crtenia  should be used explicitly to promote
ithe probability that groups are operated in a sound manner, that the parties responsible  for
each regulated entity maintain autonomy within the group managerial  structure so as to
fulfill  their responsibilities toward the individual institution, and that group structures be
supervisable. Authorization criteria must include suitability standards applicable to principal
shareholders, key directors and managers,  and external auditors of financial groups.
Supervisors must be granted the authority to prevent corporate affiliations or structures
that preclude effective supervision.
Prudential  regulaton  can be applied to conglomerates  by modifying the existing regulations
applicable to different types of financial institutions to take account of the group context,
in particular the potential that intra-group transactions have led to an overstatement of
capital and earnings. Preferably. however, prudential reglationrs would be applied on a
uniform and fully consolidated basis, increasing  their effectiveness and creating a more
level playing field among institutions that promotes financial sector competition.
Accounting consolidation of group financial entities is a prerequisite for the application of
consolidated prudential regulation, and also serves  to improve the transparency of the
group's financial position as set forth in supervisory reports and public disclosures.
Consolidated supervsion  is based, in part, on the use of sound prudential regulations and
the analysis of consolidated accounts, but must embrace  a wider scope to ensure an
adequate assessment of the risks arising from all group entities, including the risk of
contagion arising from entities that lie outside the scope of prudential regulation and
accounting consolidation, such as unregulated  financial entities and entities engaged
principally in commercial or industrial activities.
Changes in the regulatory framework alone will prove an insufficient response  to financial
conglomerates.  Supervisory  agencies will need  to modify their supervisory policies and
procedures, as well as policies relating to the recruitment, training and retention of
qualified staff.  The various authorities responsible  for different components of the financial
system will need to harmonize their activities to ensure  an integrated approach to
conglomerates.
Comments and questions regarding this paper may be directed to the author at The World
Bank.1818 H St.. Room G-8105. Washington DC, 20433,  Tel 202473-7481,  Fax 202-
522-3198  or DSCOTT@worldbank.org@intemet.
DiPART I
ISSUES,  OPTIONS  AND MULTINATIONAL  RESPONSES
A.  Introduction and Purpose
The term  "financial  conglomerate'  is used in this paper to refer to a group of two  or more
legal entities, mainly engaged in financial services activities, that  are related by ownership
or control.!  The different firnancial  services entities within a conglomerate may be subject
to different regulations and supervised by different supervisory agencies. Other entities
within the group may be subject to little if any regulation, and may not be supervised.
Many conglomerates involve a parent entity, which may be regulated or unregulated.
Often the parent is a bank.  The "parent" of other conglomerates may in fact be an
individual or group of individuals.
Fnancial conglomerates are increasingly prevalent.  Technological advances and the
deregulation of financial markets have led to increased competition among institutions.  In
order to efficiently  deliver a full range of products, financial organizations have established
ownership links among different types of historically-distinct financEal  institutions.  The
emerging f'nancial conglomerates might therefore be engaged  in retail and commercial
banking, securities underwriting and trading, investment management, and insurance
2 underwriting.
Financial conglomerates often have ownership ties to commercial and industrial firms.
These linkages may be long-standing, perhaps  the consequence of previous linancial crises
or simply the manner in which a country's financial system evolved.  They may be of more
recent origin, a result of deregulation, large-scale economic restructuring, or the need to
attract capital to support financial market development.
'Tis  is  a common definition.  The term also can be used to describe  a single  legal entity engaged in
a wide range of friancial services  activities.  As a practical matter,  however, even universal banks of the
German,  Swiss  and Dutch modd must  conduct  at least  their insurance underwriting  activities through
subsidiaries. Thus, European universal banks comprise part of fnancial  conglomerates as  the term is used
in this paper.
2A number of factors have contributed to the trend toward the formation of fnancial  conglomerates.
This paper  does not discuss those factors further.The market forces driving the formation of financial conglomerates also are propelling
greater cross-border  provision of financial services.  International integration of financial
markets has direct consequences  for domestic authorities in their regulation and
supervision of financial conglomerates. Specifically, in instances where domestic financial
conglomerates wish to expand internationally, the authorities may be asked to adhere to
intemational supervisory standards.  Such standards  were adopted in 1992 by the Basle
Committee on Banking Supervision, with the endorsement of the Govemors of the central
banks of the Group of Ten countries. 3 These standards for the supervision of international
banking groups apply to bank supervisors  in countries whose domestic banks wish to
establish operations in the Basle Committee member countries.  The standards provide that
member countries may impose restrictive measures, including the denial of entry, on banks
which are not subject to supervision that meets the established standards.  The standards
include provisions relating to group-wide supervision.'
A  basic response  to the emergence  of financial conglomerates is increased int-Legration  and
cooperation among the different authorities responsible  for the various types of financial
institutions which are operating as a group.  In some countries, the authorities are taking
advantage of this opportunity and are rethinking their regulatory policies. They are
adopting objectives such as increased competition and the creation of a level playing field
among financial services providers, and are attempting to create an environment that
promotes efficiency and permits greater integration among financial services providers and
financial markets.
At the same time, authorities in numerous  countries are rethinking their basic approach to
the supervision of financial institutions.  They are relying less on rigorous rules-based
methodologies, which tend to run counter to the principles of deregulation, and are
focusing more on management practices. They are specifying more clearly the
responsibilities of financial market participants for the sound operation of financial
institutions, and are attempting to hold these parties accountable for their performance.
Thus, in recent yea.-s  many supervisory agencies have articulated more clearly the duties
3The Basle Committee  consists of bank supervisory  authorities from Belgium, Canada, France,
Germany,  Italy, Japan, Luxembourg,  Netherlands,  Sweden,  Switzerland,  the United  Kingdom  and the United
States of America.
4The adoption of these standards nas, in part, a response to the failure of Bank of Credit and
Commerce  Intemational, or BCCI. They are summarized  in this paper in Part 1, Section  D.
2and responsibilities of directors and managers 5, adopted minimum standards applicable to
extemal auditors, and expanded public disclosure of information regarding financial
institutions.
The apparent pervasiveness of the trend toward the formation of financial conglomerates
suggests that the authorities increasingly will be confronted with  the need to address the
issues which conglomerates present.  A successful response will require adaptation of the
policies and procedures utilized in the regulation and supervision of individual institutions.
The principal purpose of this paper is to highlight the issues raised by financial
conglomerates and discuss altematives for an appropriato regulatory and supervisory
response.
51n this paper, the term "director" refers to the board of individuals most directly representing the
shareholders or owners of an entity, and responsible for overseeing the managers.  "Managers" are the senior
executives responsible for overall day-to-day operations.
3B  Principal Superuisory Concemsa
While thte issues relevant to supervisors  of individual financial institutions continue to be
relevant where those entities form part of a group, the financial conglomerate context
raises additional supervisory concems, the principal of which are contagion, transparency,
and autonomy.  One objective of regulatory and supervisory arrangements should be to
mitigate these concems.  Contagion, transparency and autonomy therefore serve as
principal points of reference throughout this paper.
Conrtgion
Contagion refers to the situation where a regulated entity is affected by financial problems,
such as insolvency or illiquidity, arising in another regulated or unregulated group member
entity.  It is the potential consequence of the various tangible and intangible linkages to
other group companies.  One key concem is the potential transfer of capital from the
regulated entity,  as might occur when it attempts to rescue another group member from
financial difficulties.  Such transfers may be evident, as in the case of loans, investments
and guarantees, or may be obscured, most often through devises such as the off-market
pricing of intra-group transactions.  Another key concern is the potential for negative
events involving another group member to trigger a liquidity crisis or substantially
diminished flow  of business for a regulated entity.7
Transparency
Transparency  is a concem in relation to the financial condition of individual group members
and the combined group, and to the group's corporate and managerial  structure.  A
potential consequence of transactions between the various legal entities that comprise the
group is an overstatement of the reported profits and capital of a regulated entity,  as well
6 hn  addition to supervisory concerns, the emergence of financial conglomerates gives rise to and-tnst
concerns relating to the potential increase in financial sector concentration.  This paper does not address itself
to those concerns.
7A similar but distinct issue is systemic  risk, where problems in an institution  spread to unrelated
entities and result in difficulties of systemic proportion.  Systemic risk is a concern with respect to individual
financial institutions as well as financial cong'omerates.  However, a financial conglomerate's involvement in
a broader  range of fiancial  markets can increase the possibility of simultaneous crises in several markets,
thus exacerbating systemic risk.
4as the likelihood  that net group  capital is less  than the sum  of the capital  of all group
members. Consequently,  the effectiveness  of prudential  requirements  and supervisory
indicators  applicable  to individual  institutions  may be diminished.  The  increased  complexity
often inherent  in the group  context raises  concems  regarding  the capacity  of supervisors  to
identify and  gauge  the risks  to which a regulated  entity is exposed. An unclear  corporate
or managerial  structure  can raise  concerns  regarding  the supervisor's  ability to identify
connected  parties 8, lines  of authority,  and financial  and managerial  responsibility  within the
group.
Autonomy
Where  a regulated  entity is a component  of a larger  business  organization,  a supervisory
concern  is the autonomy  of those individuals  responsible  for the sound  operation  of the
regulated  entity.  Supervisors  need  to be assured  that directors  and managers  can be held
accountable  for ensuring  the sound  operation  of the institution,  responding  to supervisory
mandates,  and  ensuring  compliance  with law and regulatory  requirements.  The concem  is
that directors  and managers  of the regulated  entity may lack the necessary  authority vis a
vis other individuals  within the group.  For  example,  directors  and  managers  may not be in
a position  to commit to taking actions  viewed  as necessary  by the supervisors.  They may
be compromised  in their ability  to make  objective  judgements  regarding  loans  to connected
parties. They may be compromised  in their treatment  of customers  in transactions
involving  conflicts of interest between  customers  of the regulated  entity and  customers  of
other group  entities, or between  customers  of the regulated  entity and  the other entities
themselves. Supervisory  concerns  regarding  autonomy  become  more  acute where  the
controlling  entities  are unregulated  or beyond  the scope  the supervisor's  mandate.9
8Connected parties can indude  shareholders, other group entities, the directors and managers of all
group  entities, and perhaps other of the business interests of those directors and managers.
9In addition to concerns regarding director and manager autonomy,  supervisors must be alert to the
risks arising  from the business challenges inherent  in forming and managing financial conglomerates, and
their  potential  implications for  directors'  and  managers'  ability to perform  their  roles adequately.  The
challenge of forming and  managing larger,  more complex organizations operating  in a broader  range  of
product and geographic markets,  of integrating previously autonomous management teams, and of merging
different  types of business cultures  can prove overwhelming, and is often a source of subsequent  financial
difficulties.
5C.  Regulatory Options
In principle, there are two fundamental regulatory alternatives for addressing financial
conglomerates: consolidated  regulation,  where regulation is extended to all group members
engaged In financial service activities, and separate  regulation,  where the focus of
regulation is the individual regulated entity.  In practice, both alternatives are difficult  to
implement, and supervisors typically adopt an approach that falls somewhere in between
the two,  even while their supervisory philosophy may remain anchored in one or the other.
Consolidated Reguiation
Under consolidated regulation, contagion is taken to be such a concern as to justify  the
application of regulation to all group members engaged in financial services activities, even
where the activity  would not be regulated were it conducted outside the group.  The
extension of regulation group-wide might include, for example, capital adequacy
requirements, large credit exposure limits 10, foreign exchange position limits, shareholder
and senior manager suitability standards, and required regulatory reporting and public
disclosure.  Transparency is enhanced by applying prudential requirements to the
consolidated group, as well as to each financial institution group mesnber,  and by requiring
consolidated financial reporting and public disclosure.  Concerns  regarding autonomy are
addressed by the application of suitability standards to the principal shareholders  of the
group, and to the managers  of all group financial institutions.
Conso 5idated regulation is the basis of the approach usually taken by bank supervisors,
who tend to desire explicit authority over group financial entities that might affect the
condition of the bank."  Thus it is common to find consolidated regulation applied to  banks
and their financial institution subsidiaries, and increasingly, where the parent is a financial
institution or financial institution holding company, to the bank's parent entity and its
financial institution subsidiaries.
There are potential disadvantages and obstacles to the implementation of consolidated
l"Large credit exposure  limits are designed,  in part, to cap the total credit exposure  of a financial
institution  to a single  counterparly  or group of economically  interdependent  counterparties.
"1A  common explanation for this is that banks' role in the payments systems and the implementation
of monetary  policy justifies the bank supervisor's explicit authority  over entities dosely related to banks.
6regulation.  From a policy standpoint, extending regulation to otherwise unregulated
financial institutions  due solely to their group affiliation might be seen as burdensome and
creating a competitive disadvantage. 12 From a practical standpoint, extension of regulatior
to entities regulated and supervised by other agencies requires coordination among the
agencies, and may likely require modifications to agencies' current authorities and
responsibilities.
Separate Regulation
Separate regulation attempts to minimize the potential that contagion will affect the
regulated entity  by insulating it from other group members.  The mechanisms  often
employed are to require that the credit exposures of the regulated entity to other group
members be supported by additional capital (often in an amount equal to the exposure
itself),  and/or to establish limits or other restrictions on credit exposures and other types of
transactions.  Because the object of regulation is defined narrowly as the individual
regulated entity, the transparency of the organizational  and managerial structure of the
group is of less concem.  Concerns  regarding financial transparency are addressed  by the
constraints placed on transactions with other group members.  Concerns  regarding
autonomy are addressed by the application of suitability standards to the principal
shareholders and managers of the regulated entity.
Separate regulation is the approach often taken by securities and insurance supervisors.
This approach is more functionally oriented, and is based on the principle that while certain
activities  (e.g. dealings with retail customers) are best regulated, other activities can and
should be left unregulated.
In practice, it is difficult for supervisors  to be comfortable with their attempts to insulate a
particular entity  within a group.  Contagion can result from the public perception of an
exposure, as much as from the existence of an exposure. Thus even a well-insulated
regulated entity  can be subject to a liquidity crisis or crippling loss of business triggered by
events elsewhere within the group.  Similarly, concerns regarding  transparency and
autonomy can only incompletely be addressed by attempting to insulate the regulated
entity.
'2Application of regulation to group members not engaged in financial  activities (e.g. commercial or
industrial  companies) is generally viewed not only as imprctical,  but also as undesirable.
7Regulation in Practice
Generally, financial conglomerate regulation is not based on the strict application of
consolidated regulation or narrow application of separate regulation.  Confronted with the
practical obstacles to application of consolidated regulation, supervisors often must rely on
processes designed to obtain information regarding entities outside the scope of their direct
authority, and to  control the potential exposure of the regulated entity to other group
members, an approach similar to that  employed under separate regulation.  Altematively,
supervisors whose philosophy is based in separate regulation often attempt to make
explicit assessments regarding potential risk exposures arising from other group members
outside the scope of their direct authority.  This is an approach which leans toward  the
group-wide application of prudential requirements inherent in consoidated regulation.
Although strictly  applied consolidated regulation and narrowly applied separate regulation
are not often encountered in practice, recognizing the philosophical  distinctions between
the two  approaches can help to shed light on the different perspectives of the supervisors
of different types of financial institutions.  For most countries, forging an effective
regulatory and supervisory framework addressing conglomerates will require that those
differences be resolved, so as to facilitate agreement on a common approach.
8D.  Standards Adopted in Multinational Forums
The many issues involved in regulating and supervising financial conglomerates operating
internationally continue to  be discussed by authorities meeting in mutinational forums.
Two groups of countries are devoting substantial attention to this subject: the countries
which comprise the European Economic Community, and the member countries of the
Basle Committee on Banking Supervision.  While in both instances the agreed regulatory
and supervisory frameworks are still avolving, their work to date can be examined for
intemationally agreed principles which would be applicable to conglomerates operating
domestically.
European Economic Communityl 3
To create an common intemal market for the provision of financial services, the approach
adopted by the EEC  has been to achieve only the essential harmonization necessary to
secure the mutual recognition by its member states of the authorization and prudential
supervision systems they employ.  It has applied several principles !n these efforts, and in
particular its efforts to forge an agreed approach to the regulation and supervision of
financial conglomerates.  One such principle is that supervisors must accept the market
reality of the blurring of the distinctions between historically distinct types of financial
institutions and financial products.  Another is that special rules for the supervision of
financial conglomerates should only be applied where the regulatory problems cannot be
effectively  tackled through supervision of the individual regulated entities.  A third is that
respect should be maintained for the peculiar characteristics of the different financial sub-
sectors and the legitimate differences in the way they have traditionally been regulated."
The Commission of the European  Communities reached agreements in 1992 that  began  to
establish a framework applicable to conglomerates  in which a deposit-taking bank was a
member.  That framework  was enhanced in 1993 by agreements  that dealt with
3 3This  section provides a brief overview of the EEC framework.  Part II of this paper makes extensive
and  more specific reference to the particular  features  of that framework.
'4Presentation  to  the  17th  Annual  Conference  of  the  International  Organization  of  Securities
Commissions  by  Mr.  Geoffrey  Fitchew,  Director  General,  DG  XV,  Commnission  of  the  European
Communities, October 29, 1992.  These principles lay a foundation for superseding separate  regulation with
certain  aspects of consolidated regulation,  but at the same time seem to reflect a desire to mirnnize  any
infringement  on existing authorities  and responsibilities.
9investment firms ii.e. securities companies and investment management firms).  The
framework  distinguishes between financial groups, which are primarily financial services
conglomerates, and mixed-activity groups, of which the parent is a commercial or industrial
firm, but which includes one or more subsidiary banks or investment firms.'6
The framework applicable to financial groups requires that supervisors conduct
consolidated supervision of those entities within the group which are principally engaged in
financial services activities, including any parent financial entity.  Consolidated supervision
is based, in part, on the application of consolidated regulation.  Specifically, consolidated
supervision is to include consolidated application of regulations relating to capital
adequacy, large exposures and connected lending.  Consolidated  application of these
regulations is based on a requirement for full accounting consolidation of all banks and/or
investment firms and, at a minimum, all their financial subsidiaries. 18 Consolidated
supervision is further defined to require that supervisors  ensure that all entities included in
the scope of consolidated supervision maintain adequate internal control mechanisms so as
to be able to provide any data or information relevant for the purpose of such
supervision.' 7
For mixed-activity  groups, where a parent company which is not a financial services firm or
a financial holding company owns a bank or investment firm, consolidated regulation is not
extended to all entities within the group, including to any insurance companies.
Consolidated regulation is applied only to the bank and investment firm group member
entities, and their subsidiaries, in the manner that it is applied to financial groups described
above, including a requirement for full accounting sub-consolidation  of those regulated
entities.  Exposures taken by this sub-consolidated financial group on other group members
1 5The Commission has yet to apply to insurance companies the requirements applicable to "financial
institutions".  As a result, a group where an insurance company owns a bank would be treated  as a mixed-
activity group  under  the present  EEC framnework.
' 6Wbich generaily includes all entities of which the bank or investment firms has a 20% or greater
shareholding.
17The EEC framework makes provision for an exception to application or the principle of consolidated
regulation for Financial  groups. Under certain defined circumstances, supervisors may waive the consolidated
application  or regulations relating to capital adequacy and  large exposurs  in the case of investnent  firms
which are  members of a group which does not include a bank.  Thus,  in limited circumstances, utilization
of the principle  or separate  regulation is accepted.  However, the EEC framework imposes on the relevant
investment finn and their supervisor substantial risk monitoring requirements in respect to related institutions
when this exception is utilized.  Further,  this exception may be eliminated, pending further  harmonization.
Council Directive  93161EEC.
10are limited, in aggregate, to 20% of capital.'8 Supervisors are to require the parent
company and its subsidiaries  to supply any information relevant for the purpose of
supervising the regulated entities, and member governments are to ensure that there are no
legal impediments to the flow  of this information.
Trhe  EEC  framework  includes several additional provisions relevant to the conglomerate
context.  For banks and investment firms within  either financial or mixed-activity groups,
supervisors are to have the capacity to refuse or withdraw  authorization in cases where
the group structure precludes effective supervision, and member governments are to
ensure that  enforcement provisions may be imposed on financial holding companies and
mixed-activity  holding companies, or their effective managers. For individual banks,
investment firms and insurance companies, supervisors are to be granted the power to
disapprove senior management, as well as any shareholders  owning 10%  of more of the
voting shares of the institution or having the power to significantly influence the
institution's  management. Supervisors  are to establish mechanisms  to ensure cooperation
among the authorities responsible  for different financial sectors, including the insurance
industry.
The emerging EEC  framework  can serve as an important example of the means by which to
regulate financial conglomerates, particularly once insurance companies have been brought
more fully under its scope.  Developments thus far suggest that application of capital
adequacy requirements, large exposure limits and connected lending limits on a
consolidated basis to all group financial entities will become a broadly accepted component
of such regulation.
Basle Committee on Banking Supervision
The Basle Committee on Banking Supervision is comprised of the bank supervisory
agencies from the Group of Ten countries.  One of the committee's principal aims is to
promote the enhancement and harmonization of regulation and supervision of banks
operating intemationally.  As such, its original focus was on banking groups.  However,
since most banking groups are in fact financial conglomerates, the committee has
broadened  its focus to encompass  the full range of financial activities of such groups.  This
effort contributed to the formation in 1993 of The Tripartite Group of Securities, Insurance
and Banking Regulators.
1 Excluding certain  short tern  exposures.
11The Basle Committee's approach to the supervision of international banking groups has
been centered around the concept of consolidated supervision. This concept was set forth
in the 1983 revised Concordat.' 9 The Concordat states "the principle that  banking
supervisory authorities cannot be fully satisfied about the  soundness  of individual banks
unless they can examine the totality  of each bank's business  worldwide through the
technique of consolidation."  Consolidated  supervision was defined as the supervisor
monitoring the risk exposures and capital adequacy of the institutions for which they were
responsible based on the totality  of their business, wherever conducted.
In 1992, the Committee published minimum  standards  that its members agreed  to apply to
intemational banks operating in those countries. 20 The standards include the provision that
"all international banking groups and international banks should be supervised by a home-
country authority that capably performs consolidated supervision".  Under the standards,
consolidated supervision is defined to include three components.  First, the supervisor
should "receive consolidated financial and prudential information" on the group's global
operations, have the reliability of this information confirmed to its satisfaction, and assess
the information as it affects the bank or group."'  Second, the supervisor should have the
capability to  "prevent corporate affiliations or structures that either undermine efforts to
maintain consolidated financial information or otherwise hinder effective  supervision' of
the bank or group.  Finally, the supervisor should have the capability to prevent the bank or
group 'from  creating foreign banking establishments in particular jurisdictions.2 "
39Principles ror the supervision of banks' foreign establishments  Committee on Banking Regulations
and  Supervisory Practices (later the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision), May, 1983.
20Minimum standards  for the supervision of international  ianking  groups and their  cross-border
establishments, Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, June,  1992.
21By not specifying the method of consolidation, the Committee provides for flexibility in application
of the standards  by its members.  It does not require the application of consolidated regulation as defmed in
this  paper.
22The reference to "particular jurisdictions" is thought to encompass rmancial centers offering nearly
impenetrable  secrecy, and which can be used to evade effective supervision.
12PART II
PRACTICAL  ALTERNATIVES  FOR DEVELOPING  COUNTRIES
A.  Overview
Financial conglomerates are not encountered only in the world's  more advanced financial
markets.  The authorities in many developing countries are confronted by such
organizations as well.  Where ownership or control linkages among different types of
ffnanc.al institutions a!ready exist or can be anticipated, the authorities need to develop
explicit strategies for regulation and supervision of financial conglomerates.  3
A  basic goal of regulation and supervision is to promote an environment in which individual
institutions and financial groups operate in a sound manner, thereby promoting systemic
firnancial  soundness.-'  In financial systems where financial conglomerates are present,
attainment of this goal can be promoted by takings steps to mitigate concerns regarding
contagion, transparency and autonomy.
An adequate regulatory framework  will need to  include group-wide capital adequacy, large
exposure, connected lending, and perhaps other prudential requirements, the use of
shareholder, manager, and external auditor suitability standards, and consolidated
regulatory reporting and public disclosure requirements. In pursuing systemic financial
soundness, the effectiveness of supervision can be at least as important as the precise
nature of the regulatory framework.  Individual supervisory agencies will need to adapt the
policies and procedures they have utilized in the supervision of individual institutions to
ensure their effectiveness in the financial conglomerate context.
Forging a regulatory and supervisory strategy to deal effectively with financial
conglomerates likely will require greater integration among the regulatory and supervisory
approaches traditionally utilized by bank, securities and insurance supervisors, whose
23As described in Part I, Section A, external pressure for the development of such a strategy also may
arise where domestic financial institutions attempt  to expand internationally.
"As  used in this paper, the term systemic financial soundness is meant to reflect an environment in
which the failure of financial institutions is seen as a natural  consequence of market  forces, but where the
system itself has the capacity to accommodate such failures without adverse monetary or fiscal consequences.
13objectives and methods may vary.  Bank supervision tends to relate closely to national
economic policy, notably monetary policy, and therefore usually involves the central bank.
Bank supervisors tend to view  consolidated regulation and supervision as the most
effective  means to accomplish their objectives.  In contrast, securities and insurance
supervisors often are oriented toward regulation and supervision of separate institutions,
focusing more on the ability of those institutions to meet their obligations.  Bank
supervisors tend to take a more narrow view of what constitutes capital than do securities
supervisors; insurance supervisors typically are less concerned regarding liquidity than are
bank or securities supervisors; securities supervisors  tend to take a inore conservative
approach to asset valuations than do bank and insurance supervisors.  These and other
differences exist due to legitimate differences in objectives and supervisory methodologies.
Nonetheless, the agencies' objectives and methodologies will need to be harmonized to
find a common approach to the shared challenge which financial conglomerates represent.
14B.  S&pervisary Structure
In those countries where the authorities recently have revamped their overall approach to
financial market regulation and supervision, various alternative supervisory agency
structures have been employed. Some countries have opted for fewer supervisory
agencies, bringing most or all financial market supervision under one agency.  This
approach can have the advantages of clarifying supervisory authorities and responsibilities,
improving communications, permitting better coordination of supervisory activities, and
leveraging resources more efficiently.  Many other countries have opted to maintain
multiple supervisors.  One rationale for doing so is to maintain high degrees of
specialization in the supervision of specific financial markets.  Some countries even have
moved to establish additional supervisory agencies. 25
In terms of the objectives of regulation and supervision, the distinction between a single
agency and multiple agency approach may not be great: neither structure assures
effectiveness.  Attempting to modify the existing structure can give rise to struggles
among the agencies over the potential rearrangement  of authorities and respor sibilities that
hinder achievement of the objective of devising an effective means to regulate and
supervise financial conglomerates.  Moreover, merging existing agencies, or creating a
single new agency, requires political agreement cn the branch of government to  which the
agency should report, on whether and to what extent the agency should be responsible to
the central bank, snd on the extent to which it should be independent.  Achieving such
agreement would be outside the scope of responsibility of most supervisory agencies.  On
the other hand, maintenance of the status quo may prove an impediment to achieving
effective  supervision, particularly where the different agencies are responsible to different
governments (e.g. national and regional) or different bodies within govemment (e.g.
executive, legislative and central bank) which may not share common objectives.  The
existing structure may be based on the supervision of different types of institutions whose
functions increasing overlap, placing in doubt the continued validity of the supervisory
structure.  Finally, in the face of limited human and financial resources, maintaining
multiple agencies simply may no longer be affordable.
25Germany has recently established a securities supervisory agency at the national level.
15C.  Supervisory  Philosophy
The supervisory response  to  conglomerates  needs to be assessed and formulated in the
context  of the ongoing efforts in many countries to upgrade basic supervisory objectives
and strategies. 2 6  These new philosophies  and approaches  often can be characterized as
more forward-looking and risk-oriented than traditional rules-based  approaches. They
incorporate an explicit recognition of the practical limitations on supervisory agencies
attempting to "ensure" the stability and soundness  of the financial system, and rely more
heavily on market participants and market forces to  "promote" such slability.  The task of
supervision is seen more as having the capacity to make qualitative assessments regarding
riskiness and management quality, and less as a process of testing compliance with  an
extensive set of rules.
Consistent with this increasingly-adopted  philosophy, supervisors need to clearly define
and communicate their expectations regarding the rotes and responsibilities of directors,
managers and extemal auditors, not only in terms of individual financial institutions, but
also in terms of the conglomerates of which those institutions are a component-  For
example, directors and managers  responsible  for individual institutions should be held
accountable for maintaining their decision-making  autonomy withi-n  a group context.
Directors and managers  responsible for the broader financial group should be held
accountable for ensuring transparency, and for minimizing the potential for contagion by
implementing sound risk management practices and by developing appropriate group-wide
liquidity and capital contingency plans. External auditors should be held accountable for
;eporting substantive risks and concerns regarding  the overall group that come to their
attention in the performance of their work.
Supervisors need to be equally clear regarding  their role.  They must avoid falling into the
"trap"  of allowing their supervision to function as a substitute for sound policies and
practices within the institutions they supervise.  Rather, they need to focus their efforts on
encouraging all relevant market participants to work toward the objective of the systemic
financial soundness of the principal financial markets, and on identifying and remedying
situations which threaten achievement of that objective.
261n those countries not actively engaged in revamping their supervisory philosophy and approach,
the imperatives areated  by the need to deal with conglomerates provides an opportunity to do so.
1 6D.  Financial Sector Structure
The corporate organization of conglomerates is often a consequence  of existing legal
provisions, capital adequacy requirements, and tax laws.  Individual business decisions also
are important determinants of structure.7'  Several different structures might a;ise in a
given country.
Authorities need to decide whether to specifically intervene to define acceptable forms of
corporate structure for financial and mixed-activity conglomerates.  Altematively,  they can
permit structures to be determined by the market.  The key supervisory concern in this
regard is transparency:  supervisors must be comfortable with their understanding of the
corporate and managerial structure.  Structures where it is not clear which shareholders
(either legal entities or individuals) and which managers  exercise control over the
conglomerate and its component entities, and which parties have financial responsibility for
the component regulated entities2,  must be prohibited or discouraged.  At the same time,
the authorities need to be cognizant of the potential for regulation of structure to represent
an impediment to competition and the prudent conduct of profitable business.
Several means exist by which to influence structure so as to promote transparency.  The
most flexible would be to grant supervisors the explicit power to deny structures which
they view  as not transparent.  In principle, this authority would be exercisable at any time,
and would be employed in conjunction with enforceable suitability standards applicable to
significant shareholders,  directors and managers.  In practice, this authority most often
would be relied upon by supervisors when deciding whether to grant authorization for the
establishment of regulated entities, corporate acquisitions, mergers, transfers of
ownership, changes in senior management and appointment of new directors. 29 But with
the flexibility  that this approach offers comes the risk that discretionary powers of this
nature will  be either under-utilized or abused.
Corporate transparency could be addressed more explicitly through legislation that specifies
27An objective of such decisions may be to avoid regulation and minimize supervision.
28Supervisors often look  to parent entities or maior shareholders as a source of financial  support  fGr
financially troubled  institutions.
29See Part  II, Section E.
17appropriate structure.  For example, some countries require  the use of holding companies,
whereby all financial institutions within a group must be controlled (if not wholly-owned)
by a parent company, whose shareholders  must be registered  and are subject to disclosure
requirements intended to make transparent any individual or collective holdings in excess
of certain thresholds (such as 5% or 10%).  Holding companies can be shell, non-operating
entities, or one or more of any type of operating financial institution.  The holding company
structure may be a particularly appropriate solution in situations where individuals acting in
concert own or control multiple financial entities in a non-transparent manner.30
Structure could be influenced indirectly through prudential requirements such as those
defining regulatory capital and capital adequacy requirements, and establishing investment
limitations.  As noted, the structures that have emerged  in some countries have been
determined by such rules, although the rules often were not designed with the intention of
promoting transparency, and therefore may not have that consequence.
The authorties  will need to make a policy decision as to whether they will accept mixed-
activity  groups, thereby allowing members of the conglomerate  to engage in significant
commercial or industrial activities.  Since such structures can exacerbate supervisory
concerns regarding contagion and autonomy, they must be weighed along with concerns
regarding transparency in making stch  a decision.
If mixed-activity  groups are accepted, the authorities should adopt a legal provision
requiring formation of a financial institution sub-group within mixed-activity groups.  The
sub-group would encompass all group members engaged predominantly in financial
services activities.  Requiring  a sub-group structure would circumscribe the relevant
financial sector operations, thereby mimicking a financial conglomerate structure, which
will facilitate  the application of regulation and the conduct of supervision, and help create a
more level playing field among financial and mixed-activity conglomerates.
Where mixed-activity  groups are accepted, the authorities will need to  determine
acceptable structures for the ownership relationship between the financial institution sub-
group and group members engaged  predominantly in commercial or industrial activities.
Requiring  a structure whereby all group commercial and industrial enfities are upstream of
3 0This  form of ownership structure is not uncommon in the developing  world.  It functions to obscure
relationships among financial institutions (and, often, industrial or commercial groups), and is inconsistent
with effective regulation  and supervision.
18the financial  sub-group  may promote  transparency,  and  would clarify the financial
responsibility  of those entities  for the financial  sub-group.  If group  commercial  and
industrial  entities  are permitted  to be held  downstream  of the financial  entities, limits must
be established  on the portion of the financial  entities' capital  that can be invested  in such
subsidiaries."
3tSee Part  U, Section F,  for appropriate  treatment  of such investments and exposures for capital
adequacy purposes.
19E. Authorization Requirements
Requirements for prior authorization are Important tools by which to Implement supervisory
policies.  The authorization process for the establishment of a new financial institution is
the point at which supervisors should first establish an appropriate working relationship
with the institution's  directors, managers and external auditors, who, as part of the
process, must be vetted by the authorities.  Thereafter, authorization requirements can
function  as  a series of checks during the expansion of a institution  at which time
supervisors can exert leverage to ensure correction of deficiencies in its operations.
In the context of conglomerates, authorization requirements should be utilized as a means
to promote transparency and autonomy.  Specifically, they provide supervisors a means to
implement policies regarding organizational, managerial  and financial transparency, and to
apply suitability standards promoting the autonomy of directors, managers and external
auditors.  The process of granting authorization for any regulated group entity should
include a group-wide assessment of conformity with these policies.
A number of different types of transactions may be subject to a requirement of prior
notification  and authorization.  These include the establishment of new financial institutions
that  will incur exposures to the public, the undertaking of certain new activities (e.g. those
which substantially alter the business of the institution or require specialized management
experience), significant changes in ownership, major corporate transactions effecting the
institution's  organizational and management structure or substantially changing its business
mix, and changes in senior management and extemal auditors.  Requirements  for prior
notification and authorization also should be applied with respect to parent financial entities
(e.g. financial holding companies).
Criteria for granting authorization should include the suitabi9ity  of significant shareholders,
managers and external auditors, the appropriateness  and transparency of the corporate
structure,  the reasonableness  of business and financial plans, and the existence of
adequate capital. 3"  In assessing  the suitability of significant shareholders and managers  in
32The minimum standards for authorization in the EEC require,  in part,  that supervisors be informed
of the identities of natural  and legal person shareholders with a direct or indirect holding of 10% or more of
the voting rights,  or the power to exercise a significant influence over management, and that supervisors be
satisfied as to the suitability of such shareholders.  Notification and prior approval is required  whenever the
direct and indirect  holdings of any natural or legal person reaches or exceeds 10%, 20%, 33% or 50% of the
20a  conglomerate context, supervisors should consider whether the managers  function, or
are likely to function, in a sufficiently  autonomous manner. Supervisory expectations in
this respect should be communicated or reiterated to significant shareholders  and managers
as part of the authorization process. In instances involving a substantial expansion of the
business or geographic scope of the institution or group, the ability of the board and
management to successfully undertake the business  challenges  of the expansion should
assessed. Where the shareholders  of the institution seeking authorization are other
regulated financial institutions, or entities related by ownership or control to such
institutions, the relevant supervisors  shoilid jointly assess  whether authorization criteria
have been met.
The enforcement of suitability standards regarding  significant shareholders  requires
transparency of the ownership of regulated entities.  A basic prerequisite for such
transparency is the registration of ownership positions, and the prohibition on the use of
bearer shares.  Legal  provisions should also provide for disclosure of beneficial owners
when shares are held by agents acting on behalf of others.  Regulated  institutions should
be requires,  to periodically provide to the supervisors  a list of significant shareholders  and
their direct and indirect holdings, and to notify the supervisors  upon significant changes  in
the ownership structure of the institution.  Existing shareholders  should be required to
notify  the supervisors when they dispose of significant blocks of shares. While prior
authorization powers with respect to parent commercial or industrial entities likely will not
be formally available, the authorities should require prior notification by the regulated group
members of significant transactions aff.ecting  the corporate structure of the group.
shares, and whenever  the nature of the relationship  between  the shareholder  and the institution  is such that
the institution  would  become  a subsidiary.  Further, supervisors  are to make  a determination  that managers
are of good repute and have sufficient professional  qualifications  and experience.  Counci Directives
89/646/EEC  (banks),  92/96/EEC  (life assmurance  companies)  and 93/22/EEC  (investnent firms).
21F.  Prudential  Requirements
Prudential  requirements can be instrumental in alleviating concerns regarding contagion,
and in promoting transparency.  They may take the form of statutory provisions,
regulations, norms or other types of enforceable  standards. Their principal purpose is to
ensure adequate capitalization and to constrain the potential riskiness  of financial
institutions.  The key prudential  requirement for any financial institution is its capital rule,
which defines reguatory  capital and estabishes the minimum amount of such capital that
must be held by the institution.  Other important prudential rules establish limits on risk
exposures  that may be undertaken by institutions (e.g. counterparty credit exposure limits
and connected lending limits).  Risk  limits of this nature often are fixed in terms of
regulatory capital.  In the context of financial conglomerates,  the authorities will need to
determine the means by which prudential requirements will be applied on a group-wide
basis.
Capital  Adequacy
Capital adequacy requirements involve a definition of which instruments constitute
regulatory capital (including appropriate deductions from capital), and the specification of
the amount of capital institutions should  hold.  The amount of capital to be held may be
based on several factors, the most common being various proxies for risk (e.g. risk weights
for assets based on their perceived  degree of credit risk, net positions in foreign exchange,
and net positions in traded securities subject to market risk), and estimates of liabilities
(e.g. actuarial estimates of insurance liabilities, and historic net claims payments), but also
on other factors, such as the level of the fixed operating expenses  of an institution.
The adoption in 1988 by the Basle Committee on Banking  Supervision  of an intemational
accord for bank capital adequacy (the so-called "risk-based capital" accord) was a
significant step in more closely relating capital requirements for banks to their riskiness.
This accord is mirrored in the 1989 EEC  Directives regarding  the "own funds"  (i.e.
regulatory capital) and "solvency" of banks. In 1993 the EEC  adopted capital adequacy
rules applicable to the securities trading and foreign exchange  operations of investment
firms and banks, which also makes  applicable to investment firms certain of the own funds
and solvency requirements applicable  to banks, and thus creates an integrated capital
adequacy requirement applicable to banks and investment firms.  The EEC  had previously
adopted directives establishing capital requirements for life and non-life insurance
22companies, but as yet they are not integrated with the requirements applicable  to banks
and investment firms. 33 Despite the present exclusion of insurance companies, it should be
presumed  that some form of group-wide application of capital adequacy requirements
eventually will become an intemationally accepted facet of financial conglomerate
regulation and supervision.
One means to apply capital adequacy standards  to financial conglomerates  is to utilize the
principle of consolidated regulation: a uniform capital adequacy requirement  would be
applied to aN  financial institutions within a conglomerate based on tneir consolidated
accounts and risk positions.  This consolidated  approach would incorporate a common
standard for the amount of capital required to be held against all types of risks run by
different types of financial institutions, and a common definition of regulatory capital.
Regulatory capital would be determined after application of full accounting consolidation
techniques for all group financial entities.'  Such accounting techniques will serve to
eliminate the effects of intra-group transactions, and will make more transparent the net
capital  position of the group. 35
For the authorities, consolidated application of a uniform capital adequacy  requirement in
this manner would require  that they harmonize  the standards they presently utilize for
defining the amount of capital to  be held for different financial risks (e.g. credit risk, foreign
exchange rate risk, position risk, and estimates of insurance underwriting liabilities) without
regard to the type of institution conducting the activity.  This effort will need  to address
the acceptable manner for netting offsetting risk positions in different group financial
entities.  The authorities would need to agree on a common definition of regulatory capital,
3 3 Thus,  there are tbree EEC directives relating to capital adequacy or financial groups.  One defines
the own funds, or capital, of banks (Council Directive 89/299/EEC).  The second establishes solvency ratios
for credit risks (Council  Directive 89/6471EEC). The th-rd establishes capital charges for position (market)
risk, counterparty/settlement  risL, and foreign exchange risk (Council  Directive 93/61EEC). This directive
also expands the definition of capital in respect to certain position risks, and makes applicable to investnent
firms certain provisions of the first two directives.
34See  Part II, Section G, for details regarding the accounting principles inherent in full consolidation.
35Fu11  accounting consolidation will  not necessarily reveal, however, the distribution of the net capital
among the various group mmber  entities.  The distribution of capital is important  if, as is likely to be the
case,  there  exist  constraints  on the  transfer  of capital among  the  entities.  For  this  reason,  effective
supervision  would require that  the capital adequacy requirement be applied not only to the consolidated
financial group, but also to each group financid  endty separately.
23as well as appropriate  deductions from capital.  Such agreement  among the authorities
might retain elements of the capital requirements  traditionally employed by the different
supervisors.  For example, it could be agreed  that certain forms of regulatory capital would
be permitted to support only certain types of risks (e.g. shorter-term capital to support
securities underwriting positions).
Complete harmonization  of all standards may not be required. So long as any remaining
differences are transparent to financial institutions, the users of published  financial
statements, and the supervisors  themselves, certain differences in the capital standards
and/or the definition of regulatory capital could be tolerated.  This tolerance could extend
to the accounting principles  that would otherwise need to be made consistent among all
types of financial institutions in order to achieve a common definition of regulatory capital
(e.g. loss provisioning, income and expense  recognition, asset and liability valuation, gain
and loss recognition and deferral, and intangible asset inclusion and amortization).
Consolidated  application of a uniform capital adequacy requirement  would have the
advantages of creating a level playing field for minimum capital charges between different
types of financial institutions engaged  in the same or similar businesses,  and between
financial conglomerates  conformed in different structures.  It would promote transparency
by presenting a single financial statement for the entire financial group that eliminates the
consequences  of intra-group transactions, and by preserting individual financial statements
for each entity prepared under the same standards. Utilizing one set of standards
applicable to all financial institutions also would facilitate market comparisons  of different
types of financial institutions.
If consolidated application of a uniform capital adequacy  requirement is not considered
feasible or desirable, altematfve methods must be adopted. The existing capital adequacy
rules applicable to the various types of financial institutions will need to be modified for
application in the financial conglomerate  context.  A likely feature of this altemative will be
the absence of full accounting consolidation of all group financial entities.  For this reason,
the modifications to existing rules should have the objectives of avoiding the double
counting of capital among regulated group entities, and the overstatement of capital within
any regulated group entity, both of which can be consequences  of transactions with other
24group financial institutions. 3
A commonly utilzed  technique to avoid the double counting and overstatement of capital
among  regulated  institutions is to deduct from an institution's  regulatory capital certain of
its investments and other credit exposures to other regulated group member institutions.
In practice, there are at least three alternative means of defining the relevant investments
or credit exposures.  The first is to require the deduction of any investment that
corresponds to the capital that the other group member entity is required to hold under its
own capital requiremene'.  This method, in effect, presumes  that the capital in the other
member entity in excess of its minimum regulatory requirement is available to meet the
capital requirement of the subject regulated entity.  The second method is more
conservative.  It requires the deduction of any investment that corresponds to the
regulatory capital of the other member entity (i.e. the capital the other member entity is
required to hold plus any additional regulatory capital actually held by that  entity).  This
method presumes that the other member's capital is required to support the risks it runs,
regardless of the amount of capital required under its regulatory requirement.'  The third
method is more conservative still.  It requires the deduction of all forms of financing
provided by the subject regulated entity to the other member entity, including investments.
This method precludes the double counting of capital that might arise in transactions where
capital is created in the regulated entity by creating a receivable due from the other
entityY3  Further, this method provides a higher level of comfort regarding the subject
entity's  insusceptibility to contagion from the other group member entity, in that the former
36These objectives relate  direcly  to the  key issues or contagion and  trasparency.  The double
counting  or capital within the group and the overstatement or capital within individual institutions can lead
to an under-appreciation  of the potential for contagion within the group, and will reduce the transparency
of the group's  and institutions'  fiancial  position.
37Such  investments  normally  will be  funded,  but  also  can  be off-balance  sheet  guarantees  or
commitments  in favor of, for example, a securities fim.
38TlIis  deduction method is a component of the defimition  of own funds for banks and securities firms
set forth  in the  EC Own Funds Directive.  Specifically, these institutions must deduct  from capital their
holdings of shares  and  other capital instruments in other  institutions (not including insurance  companies)
whenever the subject institution's  holding of shares in the other institutions exceed 10% of the capital of the
other institution.  Holdings below this threshold must be aggregated, and any amount in excess of 10% of the
subject institution's  capital must also be deducted.  The effect of this requirement is to diminish the potential
for  institutions to mutually inflate their capital via cross investments.
39This might occur where, for example, the regulated entity finances the sale of an asset to the other
group entity at  an inflated  value, and recognizes the  "gain" as income.
25can withstand the loss of  its entire credit exposure  to the latter and still meet its minimum
capital adequacy requirement.
To fully preclude the overstatement of capital that might arise due to transactions between
a regulated institution and unregulated group entities, the third deduction method noted
above would need to be employed. If such a provision is viewed as excessively restrictive
by the authorities, they must weigh the implications of existing and potential intra-group
transactions in their markets in terms of the transparency  of groups' and individual
institutions' financial position, and should  consider adopting prudential regulations
applicable  to such transactions, particularly to those whose effects will not be eliminated
under the chosen capital adequacy methodology .'4
These altemative methods for the group-wide application  of capital adequacy requirements
may prove simpler to adopt than a uniform capital adequacy requirement,  in that
harmonization  of requirements  among different types of institutions would not be required.
However, the altemative approaches  lack most of the advantages of the fully consolidated
approach. They will likely preserve  disparities in the minimum capital adequacy
requirements applicable to different types of financial institutions, and may produce
inconsistent results when applied  to groups conformed in different structures.  They do
not, in themselves, achieve relevant supervisory  objectives regarding  contagion and
transparency. 4'  Finally, their use can contribute to the potential for regulatory  arbitrage,
where certain activities are shifted to the regulated entity subject to the least stringent
4"It  follows  that a key objective  of potential  regulation  would  be to minimize  the extent to which
intra-group  transactions  can lead to an overstatement  or capital in comparison  to the result obtained  under
fuR  accounting  consolidation.  Appropriate  regulation  might  include  prohlbitions  on certain  transactions  and
limits on others.  A more flexible  and market-sensitive  approach would be to establish  mechanisms  for
approval of all significant  intra-group  transactions  by the board of directors or a committee  of the board
comprised  of non-executive  directors. Consistent  with a the supervisory  philosophy  espoused  in this paper,
the supervisors  would  make  clear their expectations  regarding  the responsibility  of the  board and management
to refrain from entering into transactions  that result in an ovestatemnent  of capital or that are not on an
arms-length  basis. Similarly,  supervisors  could  require that such transactions  be reviewed  by the external
auditors. Supervisors  also could require that sizeable  transactions  be reported and publidy disclosed.
4'Utilizing  these  alternative  methods  for the  group-wide  application  of capital  adequacy  requirements
does  not imply  that the financial  group should  not be required to prepare consolidated  financial  statements.
See Part II, SeCeion  G, for greater detail.
26capital requirements for that particular activity, or to non-regulated  entities. 42
Regardless  of whether the authorities adopt a uniform capital adequacy requirement or the
altemative methods, it is critical that supervisors  recognize that adherence  to a capital rule
does not mean that a given institution or group of institutions is adequately capitalized.
Capital adequacy requirements incorporate only crude measures  of the riskiness of financial
institutions, and there are practical limitations to increasing their accuracy (e.g. the need to
avoid excessive complexity).  Adequate supervision  therefore requires  that minimum capital
adequacy requirements be coupled with subjective assessments  of riskiness and
management practices in the regulated entities and, to the extent possible, in the
unregulated entities which are part of the group.  For regulated entities, such assessments
should lead to a situation where most institutions are required to hold capital in amounts
greater than the minimum requirement. With respect to unregulated  entities, such
assessments may lead to a requirement  that related regulated entities reduce their
exposures  to the unregulated  entity, or take other actions designed  to minimize the
potential for contagion and to promote the transparency of its relationship with the
unregulated  entity.  In the conglomerate context, qualitative assessments  of this nature
need be made on a group-wide basis by at least one of the agencies responsible  for the
supervision of the component financial institutions.
Large Exposures  and Connected  Lending  Limits
In general, quantitative risk limits serve  to constrain the riskiness of financial institutions
and reduce the potential for a sudden  shock (e.g. counterparty default) to render them
insolvent.  As such, risk limits can reduce potential contagion arising from institutions
subject to such limits.  Common  examples  include large credit exposure limits, connected
lending limits and foreign exchange position limits.'
With respect to certain risks, minimum capital adequacy  requirements can serve a purpose
similar to risk limits: to the extent that capital rules accurately capture the underlying risk,
42  While  supervisors  sbouId  be alert to this practice, regulatory  arbitrage need  not be a significant
concern if eadh supervisor is comfortable  with the regulatory framework (most particularly the capital
adequacy requirement)  and the supervisoy practices  of the other relevant supervisors,  and if significant
activities  do not escape  regulation  or supervision  entirely.
43In contrast, quantitative limits addressing an institution's overall exposmue  to interest rate risk are
difficult  to apply in practice, and are not often encountered.
27the need for institutions to comply with the capital charges can function to constrain the
level of risk they assume. In the capital adequacy requirements adopted by the EEC  and
proposed by the Basle Committee on Banking  Supervision,  for example, risks arising from
positions in foreign currencies  and traded securities are addressed  in this manner."
For other risks, capital rules alone may not serve to sufficiently constrain risk.  The most
notable example is credit risk.  The Basle and EEC  capital adequacy requirements'
treatment of credit risk is geared  to a diversified portfolio of exposures, and is not intended
to function as a constraint on credit exposures  to individual counterparties. For this
reason, an explicit limit on large exposures  to a individual counterparty or related group of
counterparties is a key element of the EEC's  consolidated  supervision  framework.'5 As
such, it is likely that some form of group-wide application of a large exposures limit will
become an accepted facet of financial conglomerate  regulation and supervision.
Large exposures limits can be applied on a uniform and fully consolidated basis across the
financial group in a manner similar to uniform capital adequacy requirements. This would
require  the establishment of a common definition for what constitutes an exposure"', what
constitutes an economically-related  group of counterparties4, the base against which the
4Individual member countries are free to utilize risk limits in conjunction  with these capital
requirements.
"There are two relevant  EEC directives  relating  to large exposures.  One establishes  the basic  large
exposures  limit  (Council  Directive  92I121/EEC),  and the other  makes  the  limits  applicable  to investment  inrms,
subject  to certain  modification  (Council  Directive  93/G6EEC).  In addition  to establishing  a counterparty  credit
exposure  limit, the large exposures  directives  limit  the aggregate  of all exposures  in excess  of 10%  of capital
to eight  times the capital of the institution.
4"The definition  should  include  all forns of funded  exposures  (e.g. loans,  interest  bearing  securities,
equities, etc.), unfunded yet committed  exposures  (guarantees,  letters of credit, loan and underwriting
commitments,  etc.), and potential  future exposures  that might  arise under existing  contractual  relationships,
such as derivative  contracts (e.g. interest rate and exchange  rate swaps,  etc.). In defining  the amount of the
exposure,  it is not appropriate to reduce  the face or nominal  amount  of the exposure  by the counterparty
credit risk weightings  employed  for capital adequacy  purposes.  Weightings  will  need to be employed,
however, in the case  of derivative  contracts,  where  the exposure  is not the face amount  of the contract,  bat
rather its potential replacement  cost.
4 7 The  EEC large exposure directive  uses the following  definition:  two or more natural or legal
persons  who,  unless  it is shown  otherwise,  constitute  a single  risk because  one of them, directy or indirectly,
has control over the other or others; or, two or more natural or legal persons  between  whom  there is no
relationship of control, but who are to be regarded as constituting  a single risk because they are so
interconnected  that, if one of them  were  to experience  financial  problems,  the other or all of the others would
be likely to encounter repayment  difficulties.
28limit will be established (e.g. regulatory capital), and the limit itself'.  The regulatory
capital of the group would be computed based on full accounting consolidation techniques.
The limit would be applied  to the consolidated  group and to each financial entity
separately. 49
If consolidated application is not considered  feasible or desirable, large exposures limits
should be applied separately  to individual group financial entities.  To take account of the
potential that capital is double counted among the individual entities, or is overstated in an
entity due to transactions with other group entities, the authorities should consider using
the deduction method noted above in the discussion of capital adequacy requirements to
scale-back the capital base against which the limit would be applied in each entity.  At the
group level, this will produce a result similar to the consolidated  application of the large
exposures limit.  At the level of the individual institution, however, utilizing this approach  is
less compelling than in the case of the capital adequacy requirements,  and will produce
anomalies among institutions. 50
The authorities will need to make a policy decision as to whether the large exposures limit
applicable to connected parties (i.e. non-financial group members  and other related parties)
should be lower than for unrelated parties.  The supervisory concem in this regard is
autonomy, and the potential that directors and managers  may act in a less than objective
manner in making decisions on potential exposures  to related parties.  Adopting a separate
connected party exposure limit will require  definition of what constitutes a connected
party, which reasonably could be more conservative than the definition of an economically-
related group of counterparties. 51
8In the  EEC, the basic limit is 25% of capital, subject to a transitional arrangement  that provides
for a limit as high as 40%.
4 9AS noted, this is particularly important when capital is not readily transferable  among the entities.
50Regulated institutions that  hold investments in otber regulated  group institutions will see their
counterparty  exposure limits  reduced relative to institutions which do not hold such investments.
51-II  the EEC, the 25% large exposures limit applicable to third  party counterparties is reduced to
20% for aggregate intra-group exposures, subject to a transitional arrangement  that provides for a limit as
high as 30%.  Under certain cirumstances,  the lower intra-group  lumit  may be waived by the authorities.
Council Directive 92/121/EEC. The relevant group is defined to include all subsidiaries of the institution, the
parent  entity of which the institution is a subsidiary,  and  other subsidiaries of that  parent  entity.  The
definition of "subsidiary" in the EEC context is not limited only to instances where a parent has a direct or
indirect ownership position in another entity of greater than 50%, but also includes numerous other situations
with respect to the actual  exercise of control,  overlapping membership on administrative,  managerial  or
29The authorities will also need to make a policy decision as to whether further regulation of
intra-group exposures is appropriate. Given supervisory concerns regarding potential
contagion, the authorities may wish to establish constraints on the ability of individual
regulated institutions to take on significant exposures  to certain other group member
entities (e.g. exposures to unregulated  entities for which an adequate assessment  of risk
cannot be made). In such critical instances, the exposures might be made subject to
prohibitions, limits, or requirements  for prior supervisory approval. Where less supervisory
concern exists, such transactions might be subject to a requirement  for ratification by the
board of directors or a committee of the board of directors comprised  of non-executive
directors. Additionally, all intra-group transactions could be subjected  to requirements that
they be concluded on an arms-length basis.
superisory boards, and unified  management,  among  other criteria, which  are more  fully described  in Part
It, Section  G. Moreover,  the supervisors  are empowered  to designate  as a subsidiary  any entity over which
they deem the parent effectively  exercises  a dominant influence.  Council Directives 83/349/EEC  and
92/30/EEC.
30G.  Public Disclosure and Supervisory Reportinq
Public disclosure and supervisory  reporting requirements  are key means by which to
address concems regarding  transparency.  Credible  public disclosure also can be a means
by which to reduce the potential for contagion. The common objective is to ensure that
financial statements and specialized  disclosures provide public users and supervisors  a
clear understanding of the financial condition of each individual group member  entity,  as
well as that of the financial group as a whole.
Public disclosure relating to financial institutions may derive from several sources. The
agencies responsible  for the regulation and supervision of the institutions typically
prescribe public disclosure designed  to allow creditors and other participants in the
financial markets (e.g. rating agencies)  to evaluate ar.d play a role in monitoring
insttuVtions.  Where the shares or debt of the institution are traded on regulated securities
markets, the rules of those markets also will prescribe  certain public disclosures.
Companies  laws can be another sources of disclosure requirements.
Supervisory reporting requirements are designed  for submission only to supervisory
authorities, and are an integral component of the supervisory  process. They will typically
provide a greater level of detail, and address more  issues, than do public disclosure
requirements. Often, certain portions of the supervisory reporting requirements  serve as
the public disclosure requirements  mandated by the supervisors.
Securities market and companies law disclosure requirements  typically are based on the
generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP)  applicable  to all firms in the country.  In
some countries, local GAAP establishes specific requirements  applicable to financial
institutions.  Nonetheless,  GAAP often produces  results that are deemed as either
misleading or insufficiently conservative by the agencies responsible  for the supervision of
those institutions. 52 For purposes  of supervisory  disclosure requirements,  these agencies
prescribe supplementary  accounting principles, often referred to as regulatory accounting
principles (RAP),  which in turn may influence the evolution of GAAP for financial
institutions.  Supervisory  reporting requirement almost always are based  on RAP.
In the context of financial conglomerates,  the authorities must assess local GAAP, as well
52And in some countries, clearly defined GAAP may not exist.
31as existing RAP, in terms of their consequences  for transparency.  GAAP may produce
insufficient  results, and RAP, often adopted independently by different supervisory
agencies, may not have remedied the shortcomings.
Local GAAP may offer  insufficient treatment of loss provisioning, asset and liability
valuation, recognition of income and expense, deferral of gains and losses, the inclusion
and amortization of intangibles, and the treatment of off-balance sheet items such as
derivatives.  RAP may have been established by the authorities to address such issues.  In
the conglomerate context, the authorities will need to determine the extent to which to
harmonize accounting principles such as these that are applicable to different types of
financial institutions.  Harmonization  would serve to promote transparency, ensure
comparability among the financial statements of different financial institutions and
conglomerates, and create a more level playing field among different types of institutions,
and conglomerates conformed in different structures.  In practice, the adoption of
completely identical principles for all financial entities may not be necessary.  Rather, the
authorities could harmonize the differing principles to the extent practical, and provide for
adequate disclosure of remaining differences.
Local GAAP may define the scope and method for the accounting consolidation of related
entities, but may not result in sufficiently  conservative treatment for supervisory purposes
(i.e. supervisory reporting and supervisor-mandated  public disclosure).  GAAP may not
require consolidation of non-majority  owned entities, but rather  may permit equity method
or historic cost treatment of such investments in other group member financial entities.
The authorities therefore will likely need to define RAP  that establishes more appropriate
standards regarding the method and scope of consolidation of financial groups.  Requiring
all entities engaged principally in financial services within the group to be included in the
scope of full accounting consolidation would be the most comprehensive means by which
to promote conglomerate transparency. Full consolidation would require  the offsetting of
debts and claims between consolidated entities, the elimination of income and expenses
relating to transactions between consolidated entities, and the elimination of profits and
losses resulting from transactions between consolidated entities that are included in the
book value  of  any  consolidated  entity's  assets.s3
The authorities might provide for certain exceptions to the requirement that  all group-
related financial entities be included in the scope of such consolidation.  For example,
53lncduding  sub-consolidation  of the rwancial services  entities  of mixed-activity  groups.
32where a majority of the voting rights of a financial entity are exercised by parties not
otherwise associated with the group, and where there is limited overlap among directors
and no common management,  authorities might permit that the group's investment be
accounted for under the equity method of accounting.  Exceptions  of this nature might be
granted on a case by case basis, and be revoked should supervisory  concerns regarding
contagion, transparency or autonomy arise. 5 '  Should  the absence  of the necessary
accounting techniques preclude full accounting consolidation of all financial services
entities within the group, RAP  should provide for footnote disclosures of the effects of
non-consolidated  entities le.g. the substance  of transactions not eliminated in
consolidation).
The authorities should establish mechanisms  to promote the accuracy of financial reporting
and disclosures in the conglomerate  context.  While the supervisors  themselves niay play a
role, primary responsibility for accurate reporting should rest with the directors and
management,  and internal and external auditors.  Authorities should consider requiring that
all group financial entities be audited by a single  extemal auditor.  Altematively, authorities
should provide for the designation of a lead auditor with explicit responsibility for the
veracity of group-wide reporting and disclosure. Authorities also should mandate the use
of a uniform audit date for all group financial entities.
s4The consolidated superision  directives of the EEC applicable to banks and secuities  rnus  require
the full consolidation of all financial institutions that are a "subsidiary" of a parent entity.  A subsidiary is
defined as an entity in which the parent: holds a majority of the voting rights; is a shareholder and has the
right  to appoint or remove a majority of the members of the administrative, management or supervisory
board; has tht  Aght to exercise a dominant influence, by contract or provision in the artides  of association,
regardless  of holding any  voting rights or not; is a  shareholder  and  a  majority of the members  of the
administrative,  management or supervisory board have been appointed solely as a result of the exercise of
its voting rights; or is a shareholder and controls alone, pursuant to an agreement with other shareholders,
a majorit  of the voting rights.  In addition, Eull  consolidation may be required when a parent holds 20% or
more of the voting righs  of an entity, and either actually exercises a dominant influence over it, or the entity
is managed on  a  unified basis  with the  parent.  The precise language is set forth in  Council Directive
83/349/EEC.
33H.  Imlmementatlon
Enhancements  to prudential regulations, regulatory policies, and accounting principles at
best can lay a foundation for effective conglomerate  supervision.  Implementation falls to
the responsible  supervisory agencies. These  agencies will need to revise their policies and
procedures to incorporate conglomerate supervision. Moreover, agencies' staffing, training
programs, compensation plans and use of technology will need to be reassessed. Where
conglomerate supervision involves more than one supervisory agency, the agencies will
need to coordinate their activities.  Supervisors  will need to find a means to achieve
effective  supervision of conglomerates  while at the same time ensuring that they meet
their responsibilities  for their particular sector of the financial system.  Where
conglomerates are engaged in significant unregulated  entities, the agencies will need to
ensure that risks posed by those entities for the regulated entities are monitored.
Supervisory policies define an agency's expectations regarding  the sound operation of
financial institutions, and the manner in which the agency will exercise the authority
granted to it in law.  Supervisory  procedures  establish, in part, the processed  through
which such policies will be implemented. The revision of policies and procedures should
address the major supervisory functions, including authorizations, inspections, off-site
analysis and enforcement.  It is sound practice to put these policies and procedures  in
writing.  The process of developing written policies and procedures will serve to ensure
that agency staff  have a common understanding  of underlying objectives and principles.
Written policies and procedures serve to ensure  better communication, both within and
outside the agency.  They promote more fair and consistent supervision, and can enhance
agency credibility.
Effective implementation of an agency's policies and procedures  with respect to
conglomerates will require a reassessment  of its resources  and the manner in which they
are employed.  Adjustments in the staffing mix may be required to support new tasks
associated with conglomerate supervision. The agency's training program wili need to
promote the development and maintenance of the necessary skills.  Compens.vion  and
benefits programs may need to be modified in order to be able to acquire and retain more
highly-skilled staff  Similarly, the use of technology should be assessed  and upgraded  to
ensure its adequacy in supporting supervisory analyses  and activities (e.g. inspections), the
efficient processing of supervisory reports, and the maintenance of the agency's
management information systems.
34Where more than one supervisory agency is involved in conglomerate supervision, explicit
coordination mechanisms  should be developed for routine supervisory activities such as
authorizations, on-site inspections and off-site analysis. These mechanisms should provide
for unencumbered communications between agencies' staff members responsible  for
supervision of the various component entities of conglomerates.  The communications
should include the agencies supervisory plans, and the results of supervisory activities  (e.g.
the results of financial analysis, conclusions drawn during inspections, and follow-up).  The
agencies need to stand ready to provide other information requested by other agencies. To
facilitate  information flows,  the various supervisory agencies at least should ensure that
one agency has been assigned responsiblity for coordinating information flows with
respect to each conglomerates. Agencies may wish to designate one agency to function
more formally  as lead supervisor, with responsibility not only for coordinating information
flows,  but also with specific decision-making authority regarding supervisory activities and
enforcement actions.Yr
Supervisory agencies need to establish early warning procedures to ensure that senior
management of each agency is promptly informed of potential problems, such as a
deterioration in the profitability,  funding capacity or capital base of other group members.
At a minimum, individual supervisory agencies should notify other agencies prior to taking
enforcement actions that  may impact other group members. Preferably, however,
enforcement policies and procedures would be coordinated so that agencies' management
can formulate an integrated response  to actual or potential threats.  Integrated responses
are critical  to achieving an acceptable balance between an agency's responsibility toward
an individual regulated entity, and the need to avoid exacerbating solvency or liquidity
difficulties  in other group entities, particularly other regulated entities. 5 6
Where entities within the conglomerate are not regulated, supervisors will need to establish
5 5Adequate information  flows are  critical to effective conglomerate supervision.  The capacity of
supervisors  to obtain  information  regarding  conglomerate activities, and to share information  with other
domestic (and foreign) supervisors, should be provided for under  law. Existing legal provisions, most notably
those relating to bank  secrecy, should be reviewed to ensure they do not serve to constrain the flow of relevant
information  to and  among supervisors.  In addition,  new legal provisions will likely need to be adopted to
ensure  that supervisors  have the enforceable capacity to obtain infonnation  regarding  unregulated  group
member  entities,  i[icluding industrial and commercial enies.
s6This might occur, for example, should an agency take unilateral action to require a regulated entity
to reduce or its exposures to other group entities.
35procedures to monitor the activities and finances of such group members and be prepared
to  respond when problems are detected that may have potential consequences  for
regulated entities.  This responsitility  poses a challenge for supervisors, in that they must
gather sufficient information to be comfonable with their understanding of the risks posed
by unregulated members, but avoid the potential moral hazard implicit in creating a public
perception that the entity is in fact supervised. Supervisors may tnerefore find it most
practical to require regulated entities to routinely provide necessary information regarding
unregulated group members. Altematively, the information can be obtained via the parent,
or, if necessary, directly from the unregulated entity itself.  Key information to be obtained
is that which identifies the scope and scale of the business  activities of unregulated
members, as well as specific information regarding their capital base, funding composition
and profitability.  Information regarding the asset structure may also be important,
especially regarding unreguiated  financial entities.  Where conglomerates involve significant
unregulated entities, at least one agency needs to have the clear responsibility for the
conduct of group-wide monitoring.
3
361. Conclusion
The emergence of financial conglomerates creates both the need and the opportunity for
the authorities to revamp their financial sector regulatory framework, and to reassess their
approach to supervision.  The latter may involve changes in the manner in which limited
human and financial resources are organized  and employed.
This paper has dealt extensively with the concept of "consolidation".  This concept is
operative on three different levels: prudential regulation, accounting and supervision.  In
some countries the relevant group for each purpose may be identical, but in others it will
vary.  The authorities need to find a means to apply prudential regulation to most or all the
financial entities within  the group, either by modifying existing regulations applicable to
different types of financial institutions, or preferably, by adopting uniform regulations
applicable equally to the relevant consolidated group, and individually to all types of
institutions.  An important advantage of uniform prudential regulations is that  they can
promote competition by establishing a more level-playing field among institutions and
financial organizations.  Group accounting consolidation is a prerequisite for the use of
uniform prudential regulations, and serves to promote transparency by improving the
information content of supervisory reports and public disclosures. The scope of
consolidated supervision must be at least as great as that for prudential regulation and
consolidated accounts.  Often it will be applied more broadly, since it must include some
form of risk assessment of all group entities, including unregulated financial institutions and
entities engaged principally in commercial or industrial activities.
Authorization criteria will need to be adapted for the conglomerate context.  Suitability
standards for principal shareholders, key directors and managers, and external auditors will
need to be applied on a group-wide basis when making decisions regarding new entrants
and the expansion of existing institutions.  Principal shareholders will need to be held to
standards regarding their objectives and financial condition, and managers will need to be
held to standards regarding their integrity and professional experience.  The parties
responsible for each regulated entity need to have sufficient  autonomy within the group
managerial structure so as to be able to fulfill  their responsibilities toward the individual
institution  and its supervisors.
The implementation of an enhanced regulatory and supervisory framework is dependent on
the effectiveness  of the supervisors. To promote effectiveness, the authorities will need to
37reassess  the structure  of the financial  sector  supervision  function, and  ensure  that the
responsible  agencies  coordinate  their activities. At the agency  level,  supervisory  policies
and  procedures  will need  to be modified. Policies  affecting  staffing, training,
compensation,  and  the use of technology  will need  to be reassessed.
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